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I. Introduction
On February 28, 2001, Rosa Teresa Gutierrez, a Mexican
citizen, told her ex-husband, Eduardo Arce Gonzalez, also a
Mexican citizen, that she planned to take their two children, Maria
and Eduardo, on a one-week vacation.1 In accordance with the "ne
exeat" clause 2 of the couple's divorce agreement, Gutierrez agreed
that she would not take the children outside of Mexico without
Gonzalez's permission.3 On March 8, after the vacation, Gonzales
was unable to locate Gutierrez and his children.4  He later
discovered that, in defiance of the ne exeat clause, Gutierrez had
taken Maria and Eduardo to live with Gutierrez's sister, who was
now a permanent U.S. resident living in San Diego.5
Gonzalez sought the return of his children to Mexico6 pursuant
to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction, which is implemented by the International Child
Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA).7 The Convention purports to
"establish[] legal rights and procedures for the prompt return of
children who have been wrongfully removed or retained, as well
as for securing the exercise of visitation rights."8 The court held
that, because Gonzalez did not have the right of custody over his
children, and simply held visitation rights, he could not compel
their return under ICARA.9
I Gonzalez v. Gutierrez, 311 F.3d 942, 947 (9th Cir. 2002).
2 The court defines a ne exeat clause as a "writ which forbids the person to whom
it is addressed to leave the country, the state, or the jurisdiction of the court." Id at 947
n.8 (citing BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1031 (6th ed. 1990)).
3 Gonzalez, 311 F.3d at 947.
4 Id.
5 Id.
6 Id. at 942.
7 42 U.S.C. §§ 11601-11610 (2002).
8 42 U.S.C. § 11601(a)(4) (2002).
9 Gonzalez, 311 F.3d at 949.
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The Ninth Circuit, by refusing to honor the ne exeat clause of a
divorce agreement under ICARA, removes a means of protection
for parents with visitation rights who are concerned that the
custodial parent may move the children to another country.'0
While the Ninth Circuit's distinction between custodial rights and
access rights" is not controversial in its conformity to precedent, it
is demonstrative of what many consider to be the biggest failure of
the Act - its refusal to provide a remedy for parents who hold
visitation rights to their children.12
This note will explore the facts and holding of Gonzales v.
Gutierrez in Part II. Part III will examine the background law,
focusing on the Convention and interpretations of it, and part IV
will provide an analysis of the court's opinion. Finally, in Part V,
this note will conclude that the majority of both United States and
foreign courts, in their current interpretation of the Convention and
treatment of claims, frustrate the Convention's central purpose.
II. Statement of the Case
A. Facts
On December 18, 1992, Eduardo Arce Gonzalez married Rosa
Teresa Gutierrez in Guadalajara, Mexico. 3  They had two
children: Maria, born in 1993, and Eduardo, born in 1997.' 4 The
marriage was not a happy one, and Gutierrez claimed to be a
victim of Gonzalez's physical, emotional, and sexual abuse during
their marriage and the separation that followed. 5 Reached in
10 Id. at 948-49.
" Id. (quoting Article 5 of the Hague International Child Abduction Convention,
51 Fed. Reg. 10494 (Mar. 26, 1986) [hereinafter Convention]) ("'[R]ights of access'
shall include the right to take a child for a limited period of time to a place other than the
child's habitual residence.").
12 See Bromley v. Bromley, 30 F. Supp. 2d 857, 860-61 (E.D.Pa. 1998) ("In the
United Kingdom, Article 21 has been described as toothless because it fails to confer
jurisdiction on the British courts to determine matters relating to access.").
13 Gonzalez, 311 F.3d at 945-46.
14 Id. at 946.
15 Id. Susana Galarza, Gutierez's sister, testified that, while she shared a house
with the family over a period of years, Gonzalez would often come home drunk and
behave in an "aggressive manner" toward the family. Id. After the separation in
November 1998, Gonzalez physically assaulted Gutierrez in the presence of three-year-
old Eduardo. Id.
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August 2000, the couple's divorce agreement 6 set out their
parental rights.'7
The divorce agreement provided that both Maria and Eduardo
would remain in custody of their mother.'8 Gonzalez was given
visitation rights and was allowed to see Maria and Eduardo on
Monday, Wednesday, and Friday from 2 p.m. to 5 p.m. every
week.' 9 He was also given the right to have the children every
other weekend and for vacation two weeks each year.2' The final
paragraph of the agreement, which compromises the "ne exeat"
clause, pronounced that Gonzalez must "grant full authorization
according to law, until [Maria and Eduardo] reach adult age, on
every occasion that his minor children... seek to leave the
country accompanied by their mother.., or any other person.",2 1
Both parties stipulated that the paragraph was to "be construed as
prohibiting Gutierrez from taking the children out of the country
without [Gonzalez's] permission. "22
Despite the ne exeat clause, Gutierrez, under the guise of
taking the children on a vacation in Mexico, moved Maria and
Eduardo to the United States in order to live with her sister in San
Diego. 23 Gonzalez attempted to see his children on the day they
were to return from vacation. Upon being unable to locate the
children, he eventually learned that Gutierrez had moved them to
the United States.24
B. Procedural History
On October 18, 2001, the District Attorney's Office of San
16 Id. The couple filed for a mutual consent divorce petition. Id. Gutierrez
initially sought a fault-based divorce because of the abuse she had suffered. Id. She
claims that she later agreed to the mutual consent divorce because she was informed that
a fault-based divorce might take up to five years to resolve and she was concerned about
obtaining "immediate protection" from Gonzalez. Id.
17 Id. at 946-47.
18 Id. at 946. The divorce agreement also specified that the children and Gutierrez
would live at 1635-b Francia Street in Guadalajara. Id.
19 Id. at 947.
20 Id.
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
24 Id.
2004]
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Diego County filed a Petition for the return of Children to Mexico
and sought the return of Maria and Eduardo under ICARA. 25 The
district court decided that the children had been "wrongfully
removed" in violation of Gonzalez's custody rights under the
Convention. 26  Furthermore, it concluded that Gutierrez "had
failed to establish any affirmative defenses that would prevent
their return., 27  The district court ordered the children to be
returned to Mexico.28 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit reversed,
holding that "the ne exeat clause in a foreign divorce agreement
does not confer 'rights of custody' upon a parent who otherwise
possesses only access rights to parties' children.,
29
C. Ninth Circuit's Review
In considering the district court's decision regarding the
Convention, the Ninth Circuit reviewed findings of fact for "clear
error" and conclusions of law de novo.3 ° The court, in interpreting
the treaty, "begin[s] with the text" but also "look[s] beyond the
written words."'" The court states that it will consider the
purposes, drafting history, and post-ratification understanding of
the treaty.32
The Court first must decide what effect, if any, the ne exeat
clause has on Gonzalez's custody rights.33 Gonzalez argues that
25 Id. Gutierrez removed the action to federal district court. Id. Gonzalez also
argued that the Mexican legal concept of patria potestas gives him the right of custody
under the Convention. Id. "Patria potestas" is "derived from Roman law and originally
meant paternal power over the family and household." Id. at 952.
26 Id. at 947.
27 Id. at 948 n.1 1 (The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals based its decision on the
issue of Gonzalez's rights under the Convention, so it does not consider other issues
raised on appeal by Gutierrez, specifically, the district court's denial of her affirmative
defenses).
28 Id. at 947.
29 Id. at 942.
30 Id. at 948 (citing Shalit v. Coppe, 182 F.3d 1124, 1127 (9th Cir. 1999)). A de
novo review is one in which "the appellate court uses the trial court's record but reviews
the evidence and law without deference to the trial court's rulings." BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 94 (7th ed. 1999).
31 Gonzalez, 311 F.3d at 948 (citing Eastern Airlines, Inc. v. Floyd, 499 U.S. 530,
534-35 (1991)).
32 ld.; see El Al Israel Airlines, Ltd. v. Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 167-76 (1999).
33 Gonzalez, 311 F.3d at 948.
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he has custodial rights, as recognized by the Convention, because
the ne exeat clause of his divorce agreement confers the right to
decide where his children reside.34 Rejecting his assertion of
custody rights, the Court holds that the "right" conferred by a ne
exeat clause is, "at most, a veto power.
35
The court holds that Gutierrez, because she has custody of the
children, has the "affirmative right to determine the country, city,
and precise location where the child will live. 36 Gonzalez, as a
parent with only access rights, by virtue of the ne exeat clause, can
only impose a limitation on Gutierrez's right to expatriate his
children, and at the very most, could refuse permission for his
children to leave Mexico.37
Deciding that the ne exeat clause does not confer custodial
rights upon Gonzalez, the Court next had to determine what
remedies were available to him based on his access rights.38 The
court interpreted the Convention as making a distinction between
access rights, custody rights, and the remedies available to parties
holding either. 39 According to the court's interpretation, a party
who violates another's custodial rights may be forced to return the
children, but a parent who violates another's access rights will not
have this same obligation.40 The court holds that "not all parental
disputes warrant direct intervention by courts of the State to which
children are taken" and concludes that the Convention allows the
remedy of return "only for the parent with the superior rights."'
34 Id.
35 Id. at 949.
36 Id.
37 Id. The court concludes that the ne exeat clause is "merely a condition designed
to protect [Gonzalez's] access rights, and no more." Id at 950. The court does not
explain how Gonzalez can effectuate a refusal or how the ne exeat clause actually
protects Gonzalez's access rights since the court's decision results in the children
remaining in the United States, practically assuring Gonzalez that he will have no access
to his children. Id.
38 Id.
39 Id. at 951-52.
40 Id. at 949. Under the text of the Convention, access rights, while protected under
the Convention, are protected to a lesser extent than custody rights. Id. The text further
states that the remedies for breach of access rights do not include the return remedy
provided by Article 12. Id.
41 Id. at 950.
2004]
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Finally, the court specifically cites Article 21 of the Convention,
which provides remedies for parties holding access rights, and
points out that this Article does not provide for the return of
children as a remedy for violation of access rights.42
The court concedes that one of the purposes of the Convention
is to "secure protection for rights of access."43 However, the court
justifies its holding" by contending that it is simply comporting
with the treaty's "larger purposes" of protecting children from
wrongful removal.45
III. Background Law
The Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International
Child Abduction46 is an international treaty with fifty signatory
countries.47 The United States became subject to the treaty upon
its ratification in 1980.48 Under U.S. law, "the convention is
implemented by the International Child Abduction Remedies Act
(ICARA). ' 49 Part III will focus on the text, judicial interpretation,
and evolution of the Convention, as implemented by ICARA.
A. Text
Congress recognizes that "international abduction of children
is harmful to their well-being."5  One of its motivations in
enacting ICARA is the fact that international abductions are
42 Id.
43 Id.
44 The court admits that its holding will likely result in Gonzalez and his children
seeing much less of each other. Id. at 951.
45 Id.
46 "Abduction," for the purposes of the Convention, is not meant in a criminal
sense. Convention, supra note 11, at 10503. Instead, it is intended to refer to the
"wrongful removal or retention" of a child. Gonzalez, 311 F.3d at 950. "Wrongful
removal" refers to "the taking of a child from the person who was actually exercising
custody of the child." Id. "Wrongful retention" refers to the act of keeping the child
"without the consent of the person who was actually exercising custody." Id.
47 Gonzalez, 311 F.3d at 944.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 42 U.S.C. § 11601(a)(1) (2002). While recognizing that the child is the
"ultimate beneficiary of the Convention's judicial and administrative machinery," it
concedes that the child's role is passive. Convention, supra note 11, at 10505.
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increasing, and only "concerted cooperation pursuant to an
international agreement" can effectively resolve this problem."
Congress's purpose in implementing the convention under ICARA
is to "establish legal rights and procedures for the prompt return of
children who have been wrongfully removed or retained, as well
as for securing the exercise of visitation rights."52 If the problem
of international child abduction is to be combated effectively,
uniform international interpretation of the convention is needed.53
The Convention aims to protect children from wrongful
removals because "[c]hildren who are wrongfully moved from
country to country are deprived of the stable relationships which
the Convention is designed promptly to restore."54  The
Convention is applicable only to children who are under the age of
sixteen, and applies only when both countries are signatory
parties.5
According to Article III of the Act, a parent seeking the return
of his or her child should petition a court in the contracting state to
which the child has been taken for the child's return. 6 The
petitioner must show that: 1) the child was "habitually resident" in
the jurisdiction immediately before removal; 2) removal was in
breach of rights of custody of the person, an institution, or any
other body; and 3) those rights were actually exercised at the time
of removal or would have been so exercised in absence of his
removal.57 The petition should state the source of the custody
rights.58 The Convention identifies three sources of custody
51 42 U.S.C. § 11601(a)(3) (2002).
52 42 U.S.C. § 11601(a)(4) (2002) (emphasis added). Although the Convention
claims to aim to secure visitation rights, it also illustrates the "typical scenario" as
involving one parent taking their child from one country to another over the objections of
the parent with custody rights. Convention, supra note 11, at 10505.
53 42 U.S.C. § 1 1601(b)(3)(B) (2002).
54 Convention, supra note 11, at 10504.
55 Id. The Convention applies only where the country from which the child was
taken, and the country to which the child was taken, are both parties to the Convention.
Id. The Convention was entered into force between Mexico and the United States in
1991. Gonzalez v. Gutierrez, 311 F.3d 942, 944 n.2 (9th Cir. 2002).
56 Convention, supra note 11, at 10507.
57 Fawcett v. McRoberts, 168 F. Supp. 2d 595, 600 (W.D. Va. 2001).
58 Convention, supra note 11, at 10508. "Custody rights" are defined in Article
5(a) as "rights relating to the care of the person of the child and, in particular, the right to
2004]
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rights." According to the Convention, custody rights may result
from: 1) operation of law;6" 2) a judicial or administrative
decision;61 or 3) an agreement having legal effect under the law of
that State.62
The cornerstone of the Convention is the issue of wrongful
removal or retention.63 One of the major questions surrounding
this issue is the question of who holds rights protected by the
Convention. 64  The Convention is careful to point out that
biological parents are not the only ones who might hold rights
protected by the Convention.65  For example, the Convention
details many situations in which someone, other than a biological
parent, has been exercising custody of a child.66 The Convention
states that both grandparents and foster families are able to invoke
the Convention in order to compel the child's return if they have
been exercising custody rights over a child and these rights are
breached by a biological parent.67  The Convention justifies this
rule by pointing out that "a family relationship existed between the
determine the child's place of residence." Id. at 10506. The petition should also state
the date of the wrongful conduct and the child's age at that time. Id. at 10508.
59 Id. at 10506.
60 Custody rights, if they arise by operation of law in the state from which the child
is taken, are protected and "need not be conferred by court order to fall within the scope
of the [C]onvention." Id. For example, a person whose child is taken from his or her
habitual residence before a custody order is entered does not have to obtain this custody
order as a prerequisite to being covered by the Convention.
61 The Convention warns that this language can be deceiving because, technically,
the Convention does not automatically order recognition and enforcement of the judicial
or administrative decision. ld. at 10507. Instead, it aims to restore the actual custody
arrangements that "existed prior to the wrongful removal or retention." Id. In other
words, just because you have a judicial decision granting you visitation rights does not
mean that, under the Convention, you can get your child returned if your child, under
actual custody arrangements was not under your care.
62 Id. The Convention explains that parties who have a private agreement regarding
their child's custody can seek relief under the Convention. Id. However, the agreement
must have legal effect under the law of the child's habitual residence, and must
incorporate more than a routine custody judgment. Id.
63 Id. at 10505.
64 Id.
65 Id.
66 Id. at 10505-06.
67 Id.
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victim-child and the person who had the right to seek the child's
return."68  However, the Convention goes one step further,
allowing both public and private institutions, such as child care
agencies, the right to invoke the Convention if they, in fact, have
custody rights which are breached.69
Assuming that a petitioner is able to establish that he or she
has custody rights, and that the defendant has breached these
custody rights by wrongfully removing the child from the child's
country of habitual residence, the return of the child to the
petitioner is not guaranteed.7" A parent found to have wrongfully
removed a child from his or her county of habitual residence may
defend on grounds that: 1) there is a grave risk that returning the
child would expose him or her to physical or psychological harm
or otherwise place him or her in an intolerable situation;7 2) the
return would not be permitted by fundamental principles of the
United States relating to protection of human rights and
fundamental freedoms;72 3) the petition for return was not brought
within one year of the abduction and the child is well-settled in a
new home;73 or 4) the person petitioning for return of the child was
not actually exercising custody rights when the child was
removed, or that person had consented or acquiesced in the
removal.
7 4
68 Id. at 10506.
69 Id. The Convention gives the example of a natural parent giving away his or her
parental rights to a child who is subsequently placed in the care of an adoption agency.
Id. If the child was later abducted by his or her parents, the adoption agency could seek
relief under the language of the Convention. Id.
70 See id. at 10509-10.
71 Id. at 10510. The person opposing the child's return has the burden of proving
that the risk to the child is grave, not merely serious. Id. The Convention further
elaborates that the "intolerable situation" was not meant to encompass a return to a home
with financial difficulties or where educational opportunities are more limited than in the
country where the child was taken. Id. An example of an "intolerable situation" would
be a custodial parent sexually abusing the child. Id.
72 Id.
73 Id. at 10509. The Convention elaborates that a child's preference should be
taken into account assuming the child has reached an age or degree of maturity. Id.
However, the Convention does not make this exception mandatory due to the danger of
the possibility of the alleged abductor "brainwashing" the child. Id. at 10510.
74 Id. The person opposing the return has the burden of proving that custody rights
were not actually exercised at the time of the removal or retention. Id.
2004]
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Up to this point, the text of the Convention has dealt strictly
with remedies available to parents who hold custody rights.75
What remedies are available to parents who only hold visitation or
access rights?76 The Convention claims that access rights are also
protected by the Convention, "but to a lesser extent than custody
rights."77 The Convention even concedes that while its preamble
states the objective of protecting access rights, the Convention
does not extend the remedy of return to persons holding only
access rights.78 The contradictions which exist between the
language of the Convention and its interpretation regarding the
treatment of persons holding access rights, have been the subject
of several adjudications worldwide.
B. Judicial Interpretation
1. Ne Exeat Clauses
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals decided Gonzalez v.
Gutierrez as a case of first impression.79 The only other U.S.
circuit court to have decided the effect of a ne exeat clause on
custody rights for purposes of the Convention was the Second
Circuit in Croll v. Croll.8
0
The facts of Croll are as follows: Stephen and Mei Yee Croll,
both American citizens, were married in Hong Kong in 1982.81
Their daughter, Christina, was born in Hong Kong in 1990, and
remained in Hong Kong after her parents separated and
commenced divorce proceedings.82 The Crolls' divorce agreement
granted Mei sole "custody, care, and control" of Christina.83
Stephen Croll was given a right of "reasonable access."84  The
75 Id. at 10513.
76 "Access rights" are defined as the right "to take a child for a limited period of
time to a place other than the child's habitual residence." Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.
79 Id.; Gonzalez, 311 F.3d at 944.
80 Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133 (2d Cir. 2000).
81 Id. at 135.
82 Id.
83 Id. at 134.
84 Id.
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divorce agreement contained a separate paragraph that mandated
that Christina "not be removed from Hong Kong until she attains
the age of 18 years" unless her father or the court consented.85 On
April 2, 1999, Mrs. Croll took Christina to New York, where she
filed an action seeking custody, child support, and an order of
protection.86
After Mr. Croll petitioned for Christina's return, the court had
to decide whether Mr. Croll held rights of custody under the
Convention.87 The court began by distinguishing custody rights
from access rights, holding that if Mr. Croll has custody rights, the
United States can order Christina to be returned, but if he only
holds access rights, "jurisdiction is lacking and Mr. Croll must rely
on other remedies., 88  The court held that if it were to order the
return of a child to a parent holding access rights, pursuant to a ne
exeat clause, the Convention would become unworkable.89 The
court also held that the purpose of the Convention is to return a
child to a custodial parent who will care for the child.90 The
Convention does not purport to return a child to a parent whose
"sole right-to visit... imposes no duty to give care." 91
Not all foreign courts have construed ne exeat clauses within
divorce agreements as simply protecting custodial rights, as the
United States courts have. In C v. C, a child, Thomas ("T"), was
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id.
88 Id. at 136.
89 Id. at 140.
90 Id.
91 Id. In Thompson v. Thomson, the Supreme Court of Canada decided that a ne
exeat clause pursuant to an interim custody order did constitute rights of custody under
the Convention. [1994] 119 D.L.R. (4th) 253, 589. However, Justice La Forest qualified
the court's decision, stating:
I would not wish to be understood as saying the approach should be the same in
a situation where a court inserts a non-removal clause in a permanent order of
custody. Such a clause raises quite different issues. It is usually intended to
ensure permanent access to the non-custodial parent. The right of access is, of
course, important but, as we have seen, it was not intended to be given the same
level of protection by the Convention as custody.
2004]
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born in Australia to an English mother and Australian father.92
The three lived in Australia until the couple divorced in 1986."3
The deputy registrar in Sydney gave the mother custody of T, and
the second clause of the consent order mandated that "neither
party should remove the child from Australia without the consent
of the other."94  When the mother took T to live with her in
England, the father applied to the High Court in England. 95 The
court held that: 1) the definition of 'custody' in Article 5 of the
Convention was capable of a wider meaning than the ordinarily
understood, domestic concept of custody; 2) even though the
father's right to ensure that T remained in Australia was general
and not exclusive, it amounted to a right of custody; and 3) the
removal of T from Australia without his father's consent was a
wrongful removal within the meaning of the Convention.96
2. Rights of Custody Versus Access Rights
Since the Convention's enactment in 1980, there appears to be
no clear consensus on how to treat the Convention's distinction
between custody rights and access rights. 97 The Convention itself
is contradictory regarding these rights and provides little guidance
in resolving the problem. For example, its preamble states that
one of its purposes is "to protect children internationally from the
harmful effect of their wrongful removal or retention and to
establish procedures to ensure their prompt return to the State of
their habitual residence, as well as to secure protection for rights
of access.'"98 Yet, in Article 5, the Convention specifically states
that remedies for the breach of access rights do not include the
return remedy.9
9
In Article 21, the Convention "authorizes a person
complaining of, or seeking to prevent, a breach of access rights to
92 C. v. C., (1989) 2 All E.R. 465, 466.
93 Id. at 466-67.
94 Id. at 467.
95 Id. at 465.
96 See id. at 465. In Dellabarca v. Christie, the court held that a father with access
rights held rights of custody for purposes of the Convention. [1999] N.Z.L.R. 97.
97 See Gonzalez v. Gutierrez, 311 F.3d 942, 952 (9th Cir. 2002).
98 David S. v. Zamira S., 151 Misc. 2d 630, 633 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1991).
99 See Convention, supra note 11, at 10513.
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apply to the [central authority] of a contracting state .... ,,100 Most
jurisdictions, however, have interpreted the Convention as
refusing a judicial remedy to parents possessing only access
rights.10 ' The different interpretations adopted by jurisdictions
regarding the appropriate treatment of access rights are illustrated
by the following two cases.
In Viragh v. Foldes, Petitioner Gabor argued that Respondent
Maria violated his access rights by leaving Hungary with his child,
without having obtained his permission." 2 According to the court,
the only issue they had to consider was "Gabor's access rights
under the Convention."'0 3 The court held:
[T]he Convention does not mandate any specific
remedy when a noncustodial parent has established
interference with rights of access. Rather, nations are
instructed in [Article] 21 to 'promote the peaceful
enjoyment of access rights and the fulfillment of any
conditions to which the exercise of those rights may be
subject,' as well as to 'take steps to remove, as far as
possible, all obstacles to the exercise of such rights."04
The court in Janakakis-Kostun v. Janakakis took a different
approach in regards to the remedies that are available for breach of
parental access rights."0 5 In Janakakis, the petitioner, Emmanuel,
a captain in the Greek Navy, married Gia, a member of the U.S.
Navy.0 6 Gia moved to Greece to marry Emmanuel and the couple
had one daughter, Bronte.'0 ' The couple divorced, and Gia
100 Id. The Central authority in the United States is the Department of State's Office
of Citizens Consular Services within its Bureau of Consular Affairs. Id. at 10511.
101 Gonzalez, 311 F.3d at 949. See Fernandez v. Yeager, 121 F. Supp. 2d 1118,
1118 (W.D. Mich. 2000) (holding that federal courts lack jurisdiction to enforce rights of
access under Convention); Bromley v. Bromley, 30 F. Supp. 2d 857, 860 (E.D. Pa. 1998)
(holding that the "plain language of [the] Convention does not provide federal courts
with jurisdiction over access rights").
102 Viragh v. Foldes, 612 N.E.2d 241, 243 (Mass. 1993).
103 Id. at 246.
104 Id. at 247. The court admitted that Gabor's access rights were likely to be
defeated in the current case because of his financial situation and justified their decision
to refuse remedy on the fact that Gabor had a reputation as an abusive husband. Id.
105 See Janakakis-Kostun v. Janakakis, 6 S.W.3d 843, 850-52 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999).
106 Id. at 845.
107 Id. Bronte was born in Chania, Greece, on the Island of Crete. Id.
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received custody of Bronte' ° Despite a court order prohibiting
the removal of Bronte from Greece, °9 Gia and Bronte, with the
help of Gia's father, were smuggled out of the country to the
United States." 0
Upon Emmanuel's petition for relief, the court held that Bronte
was to be returned to Greece and to her father, even though Gia
had custody of the child and Emmanuel only had access rights."'
The court, acknowledging precedent, 1 2 held that visitation rights
may not always equate to custodial rights." 3 However, the court
determined that such a distinction was meritless "where a
respondent, i.e., the removing parent, engaged in 'contemptuous
conduct' in removing the child from its habitual residence."' 4
The cases examined under Part III serve to illustrate the
difficulty the courts have had in coming to a consensus regarding
both the function of a ne exeat clause under the Convention and
the overriding concern of the remedies that should be afforded to a
parent whose access rights are frustrated by the removal of his or
her child to another country.
C. Evolution of Convention
In Gonzalez, the court points out that the Convention gives
them little guidance as to how to interpret the effect of a ne exeat
clause on a parent's custodial rights." 5 The court explains that on
108 Id. at 846.
109 Emmanuel sought a court order prohibiting Bronte's removal after Gia had
threatened him several times that she was going to leave Greece with Bronte. Id.
110 Id.
HI Id. at 847.
112 See id. at 849 (citing Davis S. v. Zamira, 151 Misc. 2d 630 (N.Y. Fam. Ct.
1991)).
113 Id.
114 Id. See also Zamira, where the court held that respondent's argument that
petitioner only holds access rights "might have some merit" but for the respondent's
contemptuous conduct. 151 Misc. 2d at 635. See also Fawcett v. McRoberts where the
court, citing Croll, criticizes that court's refusal to afford a remedy under the ne exeat
clause, stating, "[i]n my view, the majority seriously misconceives the legal import of the
ne exeat clause, and in so doing, undermines [the goal of ensuring that rights of custody
and of access under the law are effectively respected]. 168 F. Supp. 2d 595, 606 (W.D.
Va. 2001).
115 Gonzalez, 311 F.3d at 952.
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October 19, 1996, the delegates of the then thirty-five member
states of the Convention adopted the Hague Convention on
Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Co-
operation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for
the Protection of Children,'16 in an "effort to reform the then
current system.""' 7 The court further explains that, as to whether
federal courts can supply a remedy for parents holding access
rights, the language of Article 7 of the 1996 Convention is
identical to the language of Article 5 of the 1980 Convention, and
"thus creates the same distinctions between rights of custody and
rights of access.""' 8 Again, parents with custodial rights can move
for the mandated return of their children to the country of their
habitual residence, but parents with access rights are denied this
remedy. 9
IV. Significance of the Case
Gonzalez v. Gutierrez is demonstrative of several problems
and inconsistencies plaguing the Hague Convention on the Civil
Aspects of International Child Abduction, as implemented by the
International Child Abduction Remedies Act (ICARA). The Court
in Gonzalez holds that: 1) parental access rights, alone, are not
sufficient to warrant the compelled return of children to their
country of habitual residence; and 2) the ne exeat clause in a
foreign divorce decree does not confer custody rights to a parent
otherwise holding access rights for the purposes of the
Convention. 12 The Court's interpretation of the Convention leads
to further problems and inconsistencies concerning ne exeat
clauses: uniformity, children's interests, and court discretion.
A. Ne Exeat Clauses
As stated earlier, there seems to be no general consensus
regarding what effect a ne exeat clause in a divorce decree should
have on a party's custodial rights. The only two U.S. courts to
deliberate on the matter held that ne exeat clauses do not confer
116 35 I.L.M. 1391.
117 Gonzalez, 311 F.3d at 953.
118 Id.
119 Id.
120 Id. at 954.
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custodial rights.' 2 1 Yet, other jurisdictions are just as adamant that
ne exeat clauses should confer custodial rights as defined under
the Convention.12 In Thompson v. Thompson, the Supreme Court
of Canada held that a ne exeat clause contained in an interim
custody order did constitute rights of custody under the
Convention.12 1 Why are interpretations so very different?
According to the Convention, there exist three ways a party
can establish custody rights, including "by reason of an agreement
having legal effect under the law of that state."' 124 It would appear
that a divorce and custody decree would be an agreement that
would have legal effect under the law of the originating state.
Why is a ne exeat clause, as part of the agreement, not recognized
as conferring custody rights? The Convention defines custody
rights as "the right to determine the child's place of residence. 125
A ne exeat clause specifically grants a party the right to limit his
children's place of residence by restricting the right to leave the
country. However, the court in Gonzalez v. Gutierrez states that
this is not the case. According to the court, a ne exeat clause does
not allow a parent to determine the child's place of residence,
rather, it merely allows parents with access rights to "impose a
limitation on the custodial parent's right to expatriate his child."'26
Therefore, it does not confer custodial rights, and the parent
cannot compel a court to order the child's return.
One of the purposes of the Convention is to "ensure that
parents do not manipulate jurisdictional differences to alter or
avoid custodial agreements or orders that originated in the state in
which the children lived prior to the dissolution of the
marriage."'127 This is precisely what Gutierrez did by leaving
Mexico. If she had stayed in Mexico, by the authority of her
divorce decree, she would not have been allowed to leave Mexico
with the children, and Gonzalez would have been able to visit both
children three times a week, every other weekend, and for an
121 Id. at 954; Croll v. Croll, 229 F.3d 133, 143 (2d Cir. 2000).
122 See Fawcett v. McRoberts, 168 F. Supp. 2d 595, 604-06 (W.D. Va. 2001).
123 Thompson v. Thompson, [1994] 119 D.L.R. (4th) 253, 280-81.
124 Convention, supra note 11, at 10506.
125 Gonzalez, 311 F.3d at 949.
126 Id.
127 Id. at 950.
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annual two-week vacation. 128 By fleeing Mexico and residing in
the United States, Gutierrez successfully managed to avoid her
custody agreement. Yet, the court dismisses this argument.1
29
Taking the Convention's purpose into consideration, the court
holds that Gutierrez was granted sole custody of her children, and
allowing Gutierrez to remain in the United States does not result in
any change to the custody provisions. 30
As for policy considerations, the court takes away a convenient
prophylactic measure for parents who do not receive custody. If
the court were to recognize a ne exeat clause as mandating the
return of children to their country of habitual residence, parents
receiving access rights under their custody agreements would be
able to rely on this simple measure to ensure that their access
rights will not be interfered with. The Ninth Circuit's decision
makes access rights illusory because it enables custodial parents
simply to ignore ne exeat clauses and take the children away. A
likely result of this decision will be an increase in litigation as
parents with access rights will be forced to pursue a court order
preventing the custodial parent from taking the children to another
country.
B. Uniformity
ICARA, which implements the Hague Convention, states that
"[i]n enacting this chapter the Congress recognizes the need for
uniform international interpretation of the Convention."13' Yet,
because the result of every case is dependent on domestic laws, the
same case originating in two different jurisdictions could result in
two different outcomes.
For example, Gonzalez's claim would have turned out
differently if he were a Scottish citizen instead of a Mexican
citizen. In Fawcett v. McRoberts, Jean Fawcett and Colin
McRoberts divorced in Scotland, the birthplace of their son
128 Id. at 947.
129 See id. at 950.
130 Id. While the matter of actual custody may not have been altered, the rights of
access, which are an integral part of the custody agreement, have been thwarted
completely.
131 42 U.S.C. § 11601(b)(3)(B) (2002).
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Travis. 13 2 The divorce decree stated that Travis was to live with
McRoberts and Fawcett was to maintain contact with the children
on the weekends.133 Despite an order to the contrary, McRoberts
left Scotland with Travis, and Fawcett instituted an action under
the Convention.134
The court in Fawcett stated that, in order to answer the
questions regarding Fawcett's custody rights, the court must
determine whether these rights existed in the country where the
child was "habitually resident" prior to his removal.' In
Scotland, The Children (Scotland) Act was enacted in 1995. The
Act grants parents multiple rights "to ensure they fulfill their
parental responsibilities to their children."'36 These rights include
the right to regulate the child's residence, and "if the child is not
living with him, to maintain personal relations and direct contact
with the child on a regular basis."'3 7 The court held that The Act
"grants 'rights of custody' cognizable under the Hague
Convention."'3 Comparing these cases, Gonzalez was allowed
much more frequent visitation with his children, as authorized by
his divorce decree, than Fawcett was to have with her son.'3 9 Yet,
because Fawcett was under Scottish law, and had access to The
Children (Scotland) Act, she was considered to possess custody
rights for the purposes of the Convention.
C. Court's Discretion
Part of the reasoning accounting for these non-uniform
decisions is the amount of discretion the Convention gives the
courts in deciding cases. Post-Convention decisions are inundated
with examples of courts deciding a case on a factor that is not
given consideration by the Convention.
For example, in David S. v. Zamira S., the court finds in favor
of the non-custodial petitioner, and orders the custodial respondent
132 Fawcett v. McRoberts, 168 F. Supp. 2d 595, 597 (W.D. Va. 2001).
133 Id.
134 Id. at 598.
135 Id. at 600.
136 Id. at 601.
137 Id.
138 Id. at 602.
139 See Gonzalez, 311 F.3d at 947; Fawcett, 168 F. Supp. 2d at 598.
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to return her child to the child's country of habitual residence. 40
The court focuses on two issues in making its decision. First, the
court states, "Respondent's contention that the petitioner is not
entitled under the Hague Convention to have their son returned,
because he only had visitation ("access") rights and not custody,
might have some merit but for the respondent's contemptuous
conduct ... ."' In this case, it is enough that the respondent
violated a court order restricting her from leaving the country to
disregard the Convention's distinction between custody rights and
access rights. 1
42
Second, the court states that respondent, who took the two
children out of Canada, their country of habitual residence, and
moved them to New York, has not rebutted the inference that these
children continue to have substantial, meaningful connection to
Ontario. Specifically, the children have numerous relatives
(maternal and paternal) living in Ontario; friends and
acquaintances of both parents reside there; there is a sizeable
Orthodox Jewish community in Toronto in which the children can
become involved; and the respondent continues to maintain an
apartment in Toronto. 4
3
Granted, while one of the affirmative defenses available to a
respondent found to have taken children wrongfully is that they
have become too settled in their new community and that return to
their country of habitual residence would be too traumatic to them,
the Convention never states that a respondent has to prove that the
children no longer have ties to the community from which they
140 David S. v. Zamira S., 151 Misc. 2d 630 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1991).
141 Id. at 635. The court in Janakakis-Kostun v. Janakakis held that the custodial
respondent must return her child to the petitioner for the same reasoning. 6 S.W.3d 843,
849 (Ky. Ct. App. 1999). The court, citing Zamira, reasoned, "David S. acknowledged
that visitation rights may not always equate to custodial rights. The case nevertheless
held that such a distinction was meritless where respondent, i.e., the removing parent,
engaged in 'contemptuous conduct' in removing the child from its habitual residence."
Id.
142 The Convention considers a removal to be "'wrongful' when: 1) it is in breach of
rights of custody and 2) at the time of the removal or retention those rights were actually
exercised.... [a] court order prohibiting the respondent from leaving the country does
not confer custody rights to a parent holding access rights, and it is a stretch to say that
respondent breached custody rights with her removal of the child." Convention, supra
note 11, at 10498.
143 Zamira, 151 Misc. 2d at 636.
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were taken.'44 Furthermore, if this was a requirement under the
Convention, few respondents could rebut the inference of
substantial, meaningful ties to the country of habitual residence
because the petitioner in every case usually continues to reside
there.
D. Child's Best Interest
From a policy standpoint, the court in Gonzalez v. Gutierrez
relegates the bonds that exist between children and parents who
only have visitation rights to the back burner. The court states that
a "third and 'lesser' purpose of the Convention is to 'secure
protection for rights of access."' 145  It further concedes that its
"interpretation of custody will undoubtedly result in some
frustration of [Gonzalez's] visitation rights, as traveling to the
United States from Mexico will involve a not inconsiderable
amount of time and expense. Unfortunately, as a result,
[Gonzalez] will undoubtedly be able to see far less of his
children.,
146
The Convention finds that "international abduction or
wrongful retention of children is harmful to their well-being.' 147
Why is it harmful when a parent with access rights abducts a child
(thereby interfering with the custodial parent's right to custody),
but it is not harmful for a custodial parent to abduct a child
(effectively obliterating the access rights)? Why does the
interference with custody warrant a return of the child, but the
interference with sometimes daily access rights does not? Are the
courts suggesting that the loss of contact with a parent who has
visitation rights is any less harmful to the child than the loss of
contact with a parent with custody rights?
V. Conclusion
On its surface, Gonzalez v. Gutierrez seems like a case that
was correctly decided. In Gonzalez, a fairly unsympathetic
petitioner allegedly abused his wife in front of his children, even
after their divorce, and now seeks to have his children returned to
144 See id.
145 Gonzalez, 311 F.3d at 946 (quoting Convention, supra note 11, at pmbl.).
146 Id. at 950-51.
147 42 U.S.C. § 11601(a)(1) (2002).
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him. 1 48  Few would be disturbed by the knowledge that the
allegedly abusive Gonzalez will rarely see his children in the
future. But the problem with Gonzalez, and the problem with the
Convention as implemented by ICARA, is that not all petitioners
are as menacing as Mr. Gonzalez. 149  What happens when the
petitioner is a loving mother or father who misses his or her
children and likely will never see them again due to financial
constraints or other barriers that prevent them from traveling from
country to country?
The way the Ninth Circuit and the Convention distinguish
between custody rights and access rights disregards the importance
of the parent-child relationship. The initial goal of the Convention
- to order the return of children who have been wrongfully
removed - is admirable. But why do we say that a parent who has
custody of a child is entitled to that child's return, but a parent
who may have daily visitation rights is not? Why is one type of
relationship between parent and child valued more highly than
another? Do the courts and the drafters of the Convention
honestly believe that they are acting in the best interests of the
child when they order his return to an adoption agency (because
the agency has custody) after a biological parent (who has access
rights) takes him out of the country? 5 °
The Convention, and the courts in their interpretation of the
Convention, deem custody rights superior to visitation rights.'5'
One could make the argument that disrupting a child's custody
arrangement is more detrimental than disrupting visitation rights
because custody rights impact more aspects of a child's life. The
custodial parent decides where and in what environment the child
will live, what school the child will attend, and what acquaintances
the child will keep. A parent's visitation rights rarely affect these
aspects of the child's life. However, in a world where children
may have no say in who gets custody of them, the court severely
underestimates the relationship that may exist between the child
148 Gonzalez, 311 F.3d at 946.
149 See Fawcett v. McRoberts, 168 F. Supp. 2d 595, 595 (W.D. Va. 2001); Zamira,
151 Misc. 2d at 630; Janakakis-Kostun v. Janakakis, 6 S.W.3d 843, 843 (Ky. Ct. App.
1999).
150 Convention, supra note 11, at 10505-06.
151 See Gonzalez, 311 F.3d at 950.
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and the parent with visitation rights and fails to consider the
potentially disastrous effects that separation from a parent with
visitation rights may have on a child.
The court's treatment of the ne exeat clause is impractical and
has serious policy ramifications. Why are we ignoring a specific
order within divorce decrees that prohibits parents from leaving
the country with their children? Is an agreement that has legal
effect and in which both parties contemplated the terms any less
persuasive than a court order? The court's decision indicates that,
in order for a parent to secure his access rights, he will have to
initiate a suit against his ex-spouse and specifically seek a court
order that says essentially the exact same thing as a ne exeat
clause.152 The ne exeat clause is said to give a parent with access
rights a 'veto power."53 But how helpful is that veto power when
it loses all effect once a parent is out of the country? While the
court acknowledges this 'veto power,' it fails to demonstrate how
this power has any effect.
Courts around the world apply their own interpretation of the
Convention to the cases involving international child abduction.
While I disagree with the Ninth Circuit's treatment of Gonzalez
because it disregards the ne exeat clause and treats custody rights
as superior to visitation rights,'54 the court is not off base in its
interpretation of the Convention. According to the Ninth Circuit,
the Convention had the chance in 1996 to modify its treatment of
custody rights and access rights and it chose not to make any
changes. But the problem with the Convention is that it leaves too
much open for interpretation. It purports to protect access rights
and then provides no judicial remedy for them.'55 It strives for
uniform application,"' yet its language lends itself to several
different interpretations. Until the Convention corrects these
flaws, there will be no uniformity, and courts will continue to
tailor the language of the Convention to help them reach desired
results.
SARA J. BASS
152 See Janakakis-Kostun, 6 S.W.3d at 846.
153 Gonzalez, 311 F.3d at 949.
154 Id. at 950.
155 See generally Convention, supra note 11.
156 Id.
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